-check for valid airspeed_validated (declared valid plus updated less than 1s ago)
-added param (COM_ARM_ARSP_EN) to enable/disable check for max airspeed for arming set max
airspeed limit to half of stall airspeed
Signed-off-by: Silvan Fuhrer <silvan@auterion.com>
- commander preflightcheck use estimator_sensor_bias message instead of EKF state index magic number
- ekf2 publish estimated bias limits in estimator_sensor_bias
- preflightcheck only error if bias estimate exceeds half of configured limit (delete COM_ARM_EKF_AB and COM_ARM_EKF_GB parameters)
- split out switches from manual_control_setpoint into new message manual_control_switches
- manual_control_switches published at minimal rate (~ 1 Hz) or immediately on change
- simple switch debounce in rc_update (2 consecutive identical decodes required)
- manual_control_switches logged at full rate rather than sampled at (5-10% of messages logged)
- manual_control_setpoint publish at minimal rate unless changing
- commander handle landing gear switch for manual modes
- processing of mode_slot and mode_switch is now split so we only do one or the other (not both)
- a future step will be to finally drop mode_switch and accompanying switches entirely
Co-authored-by: Matthias Grob <maetugr@gmail.com>
- ekf2 can now run in multi-instance mode (currently up to 9 instances)
- in multi mode all estimates are published to alternate topics (eg estimator_attitude instead of vehicle_attitude)
- new ekf2 selector runs in multi-instance mode to monitor and compare all instances, selecting a primary (eg N x estimator_attitude => vehicle_attitude)
- sensors module accel & gyro inconsistency checks are now relative to the mean of all instances, rather than the current primary (when active ekf2 selector is responsible for choosing primary accel & gyro)
- existing consumers of estimator_status must check estimator_selector_status to select current primary instance status
- ekf2 single instance mode is still fully supported and the default
Co-authored-by: Paul Riseborough <gncsolns@gmail.com>
- inconsistency checks now run continuously instead of only preflight
- keep inconsistencies for all sensors
- add per sensor data validator state as overall health flag
- in practice this is mostly useful for identifying incorrect rotations
which we mostly have in 45 degree increments
- handling a vehicle on the ground can easily disturb one mag by more than 30 degrees, so this is often distracting noise
This removes the check for the current position of the VTOL swtich, as arming is already prevented if in transition mode,
plus also if VTOL and in fixed-wing mode (unless CBRK_VTOL_ARMING is set).
Signed-off-by: Silvan Fuhrer <silvan@auterion.com>
A parameter spcifies what the redundancy level for 5V rail supply
needs to be and a check makes sure that it's available before
taking off such that the user is aware of a broken or disconnected
redundant power module.
Because of warnings on every flight on setups without
any need for concern. Some even high quality supply voltage regulators
that are rated for 5V can with tolerances and load get lower than 4.9V.
- skip avionics rail voltage check when USB connected
- skip forced reboot on USB disconnect if circuit breaker set
- avionics voltage preflight check don't silently fail if system_power unavailble
- explicitly set supply check circuit breaker (CBRK_SUPPLY_CHK)
- create common uORB::PublicationBase
- uORB::PublicationQueued types are now type aliases
- ORB_PRIO use enum type everywhere to avoid accidental misuse
- PX4Accelerometer/PX4Gyroscope/etc driver libs explicitly advertise on construction, unadvertise on destruction. This is a workaround for any potential issues that might appear when accel/gyro cdev and uORB indexing doesn't align.
* commander: add check for VTOL airfame on fmu-v2
This adds a preflight check when a VTOL airframe is configured
on a fmu-v2 where VTOL is no longer included.
* commander: address code review comments
The checks did previously only report the first failure (to not overload the radio link). As we are moving to buffered messages and higher bandwidth links this design choice is not any more in the best interest of the drone operator. We are now reporting all detected failures. To ensure architectural consistency more checks have been moved from the commander mainloop into the respective classes.
This enables us to have better situational awareness during development and when inspecting a system in the field as to which subsystem is currently faulty. These flags are from standard MAVLink and are not sufficient nor do they match well the actual critical path to a safe flight. This will be addressed in a second step with the addition of a new MAVLink message and new flags.
Lorenz Meier